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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in the period from
United States v. Reese through Shelby County v. Holder. Reese and Shelby County expose
the most rigorous stance the Court has employed to review congressional efforts to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, while the years in-between show Congress and the
Court working more in tandem, at times displaying remarkable indifference to blatant
violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, and elsewhere working cooperatively to help
vindicate the Amendment’s promise. Defying simple explanation, this vacillation between
cooperation and resistance captures the complex and deeply consequential way concerns
about federal power, state autonomy, institutional overreaching, and race-conscious
decision-making of various sorts have coalesced at particular moments. The result is a
narrative that shows both the progress that is possible when the Fifteenth Amendment is
vigorously enforced and the damage that is done when it is not.
Keywords: Fifteenth Amendment, United States v. Reese, Shelby County v. Holder, Congress, Supreme Court,
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Introduction
THE

most recent Supreme Court decision to address Congress’s power to enforce the

Fifteenth Amendment bears a striking resemblance to its first. Separated by 137 years,
United States v. Reese1 and Shelby County v. Holder2 both struck down statutes Congress
had crafted to enforce the Amendment based on controversial readings of the statutes in
question. Both dismissed undisputed evidence of unconstitutional racial discrimination in
voting. Both announced relatively narrow holdings that ostensibly left room for Congress
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to remedy the constitutional defect at a moment when the justices had reason to think
new congressional action would not be forthcoming.
Reese and Shelby County frame nearly a century and a half of dialogue between Congress
and the Court over federal power to address racial discrimination in voting. The two
decisions capture the most rigorous stance the Court has employed to review
congressional efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. During the years in-between,
Congress and the Court have worked more in tandem, at times displaying remarkable
indifference to blatant violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, and elsewhere working
cooperatively to help vindicate the Amendment’s promise. Defying simple explanation,
this vacillation between cooperation and resistance captures the complex and deeply
consequential way concerns about federal power, state autonomy, institutional
overreaching, and race-conscious decision-making of various sorts have coalesced at
particular moments.
This chapter examines efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in the period from
Reese through Shelby County. It identifies five periods that capture the ebb and flow of
Congress’s efforts in this realm and the Court’s varied responses to them. The result is a
narrative that shows both the progress that is possible when the Fifteenth Amendment is
vigorously enforced and the damage that is done when it is not.

Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment

I. Reconstruction and its Aftermath,
1870-1890
(p. 366)

Ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The new Amendment was
designed to entrench federal laws that mandated race-neutral voting qualifications in the
former Confederacy, while extending that practice to states in the North and West where
explicit race-based exclusions persisted. The product of a compromise, the new
Amendment did nothing to limit suffrage limitations based on nativity, property,
education, or religious belief, nor did it reach race-based barriers to office holding. It
nevertheless made clear what some had previously doubted, namely, that Congress had
power to block racial discrimination that denied or abridged the franchise. The new
Amendment was explicit on this point and vested Congress with power to enforce it “by
appropriate legislation.”3
Shortly after the Amendment’s ratification, Congress invoked the enforcement power the
new amendment provided. In quick succession, Congress enacted three statutes meant to
address the violence and resistance African-American voters were increasingly
confronting in the former Confederacy. The Enforcement Act of 1870 stated that citizens
“otherwise qualified by law to vote … shall be entitled and allowed to vote … without
distinction of race, color or previous condition of servitude.” The 1870 Act set forth
various penalties for public and private conduct that interfered with voting, and two acts
passed the following year bolstered the initial law with additional penalties and improved
enforcement mechanisms.4
The first challenge to these Acts was soon to come. United States v. Reese arose after an
African-American man named William Garner was unable to vote in a municipal election
held in Lexington, Kentucky, on January 31, 1873. State law required voters to pay a poll
tax in advance of the election. Garner had tried to do so, but the city tax collector had
refused to accept payment “on account of the race and color of Garner.” Garner
accordingly attempted to vote on Election Day by presenting an affidavit attesting to his
efforts to pay the tax. Hiram Reese and Matthew Foushee were election inspectors who,
over the dissent of a colleague, refused to let Garner vote.5
Federal indictments followed that charged Reese and Foushee with violating sections 3
and 4 of the 1870 Act. Section 3 provided that “the offer” of a citizen to carry out a statemandated prerequisite to voting was “performance in law of such act” should an election
official wrongfully prevent that offer from being “carried into execution.”6 Section 4 made
it a criminal offense “wrongfully [to] refuse or omit to receive … the vote of such (p. 367)
citizen,” or to prevent a citizen “from doing any act required to be done” to “qualify him
to vote or from voting at an election as aforesaid.”7
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Reese and Foushee challenged the indictments, maintaining that sections 3 and 4 of the
1870 Act were not “appropriate legislation” enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court agreed. Chief Justice Waite’s majority opinion observed that “Congress
can interfere” in state elections only when a state “wrongful[ly] refus[es] to receive the
vote of a qualified elector … because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
The chief justice read sections 3 and 4 to reach beyond such race-based denials to
encompass wrongful denials of the vote more generally. He wrote that section 3 “does not
in express terms limit the offense … to a wrongful discrimination on account of race,” and
that section 4 similarly contained “no words of limitation, or reference even, that can be
constructed as manifesting any intention to confine its provisions to the terms of the
Fifteenth Amendment.”8
Without doubt, there were better ways to read the statute. The first section of the 1870
Act explicitly recognized the racial component the chief justice said was missing. It
specified that qualified citizens must be allowed to vote “without distinction of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.”9 Sections 3 and 4 described statutory offenses based
on the wrongful conduct “aforesaid.”10 There was, moreover, no dispute that Congress
enacted the statute to address the race-based violence and discrimination black voters
were confronting in the South.11 And there was no doubt that the defendants themselves
had blocked a voter based on a “distinction of race,” which meant the statute was
constitutional as applied to them.
A simple drafting change would have cured the legal deficiency Reese identified, but that
change was not implemented. Reese, along with United States v. Cruikshank,12 which the
Court decided the same day and which identified an analogous legal error in the
applicable indictments,13 was issued at a moment when political support for federal
intervention in the South was waning.14
As a matter of constitutional law, however, Reese and Cruikshank did nothing to
circumscribe Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. Despite the Court’s
uncharitable reading of the statute and indictments, the two decisions never questioned
Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment with decidedly intrusive
measures, including ones that supplanted state law and “substitute[d] … performance
wrongfully prevented (p. 368) for performance itself.”15 Nor did either decision doubt
Congress’s power to reach private action when enforcing the Amendment, even though
that power had been challenged in both cases, and Cruikshank deemed the absence of
state action as sufficient grounds to dismiss separate counts brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment.16
These omissions may, of course, reflect nothing more than that the Court had already
dispensed with the voting claims on other grounds.17 Yet both cases presented the Court
with the opportunity to limit congressional power, and in both cases it declined to do so,
leaving open the possibility that Congress possessed these broad powers. Judging by a

Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment
later case, moreover, this willingness may have reflected more than just opportunistic
restraint.
Eight years after Reese, the Court addressed Congress’s power to regulate privately
orchestrated, racially motivated, election-related violence. The defendants in Ex parte
Yarbrough18 had assaulted a black man to keep him from voting in the 1882
congressional elections. The defendants challenged their convictions, arguing, among
other things, that Fourteenth Amendment precedent blocked Congress from reaching
private conduct.19 But the Yarbrough Court disagreed. Observing that the cited cases
addressed Congress’s ability to protect “mere invasions of private rights,”20 Yarbrough
held that Congress possessed distinctly broad power to protect foundational rights
“essential to the healthy organization of government itself.” Absent this power, “the very
sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and outrage,
without legal restraint … .”21 Put differently, states needed healthy representative
institutions to govern responsibly, and thus Congress needed the power to ensure such
institutions existed and were maintained.22
In so holding, Yarbrough was building on Strauder v. West Virginia,23 which held that a
state law barring black men from jury service violated the equal protection clause.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment had not previously been understood to cover
“political” rights such as jury service,24 Strauder observed that the law inexorably denied
black citizens excluded from the jury “the privilege of participating fully … in the
administration of justice”25 and threatened to deny black defendants impartial treatment.
Strauder thereby suggested that protecting the right to race-neutral jury service might
also protect the rights of black defendants.26 In other words, Strauder sought “to create
the institutions necessary for the vindication of private rights.”27
Yarbrough, likewise, recognized the need to foster institutions necessary for
healthy governance, but understood Congress to be the critical actor in this project. The
(p. 369)

Court deemed the provisions of the Enforcements Act under which the Yarbrough
defendants had been convicted appropriate measures to protect “the exercise of rights …
essential to the healthy organization of government itself.”28 The decision, moreover,
invited Congress to remain vigilant and aggressively police the political process so as to
vindicate foundational rights.
For a brief moment, Congress appeared inclined to accept this invitation. Following
Republican victories in 1888, a new bill was introduced to revive the Enforcement Acts
and expand federal power to supervise elections, guard against fraud and intimidation,
and remedy violations that occurred. But this bill died in the Senate in 1891 as competing
priorities divided and distracted its Republican supporters.29 Decades passed before
Congress would again take up Yarbrough’s invitation to protect the right to vote.30
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II. Dormancy: Non-enforcement of the
Fifteenth Amendment, 1890-1965
Beginning in Mississippi in 1890 and culminating in Georgia in 1908, the former
Confederate states either held constitutional conventions or sponsored referenda
deliberately crafted to limit voter participation. The principal goal of these efforts was to
entrench white supremacy, as their supporters proudly announced.31 By design, these
efforts also entrenched one-party Democratic rule and the interests of the party’s
wealthiest, landowning members.32 In the years that followed, scores of onerous and
deceptive hurdles were erected to block African-American voters and a host of poor white
voters from registering and casting ballots.
Both Congress and the Court responded with remarkable indifference. For a time, the
Committee on Elections within the House of Representatives continued to review
disputed congressional elections marked by violence, fraud, or discriminatory practices.
It even periodically refused to recognize the nominal winner and ordered that the
defeated candidate be seated. But these efforts were short-lived,33 and Congress as a
whole showed little interest in resisting the disenfranchisement project under way in the
Southern states. A bill (p. 370) to revive enforcement died in 1891, and by 1894, Congress
voted to repeal substantial portions of the 1870 and 1871 Acts.34
Nine years later, the Court scrapped one of the surviving provisions of the 1870 Act. What
had been section 5 established criminal penalties for “any person” who, through bribery
or threats, hindered the exercise of voting rights as guaranteed by the Fifteenth
Amendment.35 James v. Bowman36 deemed the provision unconstitutional, holding that
Congress could not reach purely private action when enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment.37 In so holding, the Court relied on the very Fourteenth Amendment
precedent Yarbrough had distinguished a quarter century earlier.38 The James decision
thereby turned its back on the expansive vision of congressional power Yarbrough had
advanced, and the mandate to act that had accompanied it. No longer did the justices see
any meaningful difference between Congress’s power to address “mere invasions of
private rights” and its power to protect “the exercise of rights … essential to the healthy
organization of government itself.”39 The theory of a special federal power to ensure the
proper functioning of the state political process was gone.
Concurrently with James v. Bowman, the Court turned back a Fifteenth Amendment
challenge to the registration requirements mandated by the 1901 Alabama Constitution.
Montgomery resident Jackson Giles brought the case on behalf of himself and other black
men who attempted to register but “[were] refused arbitrarily on the ground of [their]
color … while all white men were registered.”40 The Court insisted that it had no power to
grant meaningful relief, largely because it was convinced that granting Giles the relief he
sought would do him no good. According to Justice Holmes, insofar as “the great mass of
the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting … a name on a piece of paper
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will not defeat them.”41 Giles should instead seek relief for this “great political wrong”
from either Alabama itself or from the “legislative and political department[s]” of the
federal government.42
Absent the vote, Giles had little chance of securing meaningful relief in Alabama,
although he did try.43 Congress had no interest in helping, either. The year after Giles, the
House Committee on Elections announced it was withdrawing from adjudicating
congressional election disputes. The Committee explained that to declare a victor “not
elected” because of “the disfranchisement of the colored vote” would be “precedent for
unseating nearly every member of the House” from the former Confederate states.44
Channeling Giles in a perverse Catch-22, the Committee instructed those citizens who
found themselves (p. 371) unlawfully denied a ballot to file suit, and “carry it, if necessary,
to the Supreme Court,” which it said was the proper forum to deal with such issues.45
Congress followed up in 1909 and again in 1911, by repealing all but three of the
remaining sections of the 1870 and 1871 Enforcement Acts.46
As a group, Southern whites were, at the time, less supportive of onerous voting
restrictions than Justice Holmes indicated in Giles. Responsible pushback from Congress
and the Court might well have displaced the new state measures.47 Instead, the
restrictions remained in place without serious federal challenge, with the result that
these measures achieved the massive disenfranchisement and the white domination in
representation they were designed to promote. Justice Holmes’s claim about the
preferences of the white population may have been empirically false when he said it, but
it became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The result was a diminished electorate. Coupled with more modest and segmented
franchise restrictions in the North and West,48 this newly constrained electorate ensured
Congress would remain indifferent to disenfranchisement for decades. Fueling this
indifference was ever-worsening malapportionment and the Court’s insistence that this
problem was nonjusticiable.49 Nor did the justices help matters when, in 1937, they voted
to uphold the poll tax against Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendment challenges.50 Due
largely to Southern opposition, proposals for Congress to outlaw the poll tax in federal
elections made little progress.51
Still, the Court managed periodically to deploy the Fifteenth Amendment to provide
isolated relief. Giles notwithstanding, it found sufficient authority to strike down
Oklahoma’s notorious grandfather clause as a blatant violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment, and to scrap the invidious replacement the state concocted for it.52 The
Court also deemed later iterations of Texas’s infamous white primary to run afoul of the
Fifteenth Amendment, and, in 1944 and again 1953, invalidated variations on the
practice.53 The Court read the Fifteenth Amendment to preclude an Alabama
gerrymander that removed almost every African-American resident from the city of
Tuskegee.54 The later decisions provided some relief, and African-American voter
registration, particularly in cities, climbed slowly in their wake.55
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As it did, a broader attack on the South’s Jim Crow regime had begun. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education was followed by the
Montgomery Bus boycott of 1955-1956, after which Congress enacted its first civil rights
law since 1875. Shepherded to passage by Texas senator Lyndon Baines Johnson, the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 was a modest measure that empowered the attorney general to
seek injunctive relief when enforcing voting rights, expanded the ability of federal courts
to hear such actions, and made changes within the Justice Department that allowed for
the creation of the Civil Rights Division.56 The Civil Rights Act of 1960 added recordkeeping requirements that increased federal power to inspect and monitor registration
practices, and thus brought discriminatory practices into better view.57
(p. 372)

Time-consuming lawsuits followed that yielded hard-fought victories but little progress on
voting rights. State and local officials replaced invalidated electoral practices with new
discriminatory measures that would require more litigation to displace. As explicit racial
lines fell on buses, at lunch counters, and, after the massive 1964 Civil Rights Act, in
public accommodations generally, African-American voters in the South continued to
confront significant obstacles when they attempted to register and vote.58

III. Determined Enforcement, 1965-1986
In March 1965, televised protests in Selma, Alabama vividly captured the depth of
Southern resistance to ending race-based disenfranchisement,59 and prompted President
Johnson to call on Congress to enact a new voting law. Observing that what happened in
Selma was part of a “far larger movement” seeking equality and “the full blessings of
American life,” President Johnson invoked the language of the civil rights protestors, and
famously stated, “[t]heir cause must be our cause, too. Because it is not just Negroes, but
really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And
we shall overcome.”60
Congress responded with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). Often labeled the “crown
jewel” of the civil rights movement,61 the VRA targeted the most recalcitrant and
discriminatory jurisdictions and subjected them to intrusive requirements designed to
secure African-American access to the ballot.62 Passage of the statute launched an era in
which Congress aggressively enforced the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress repeatedly
reauthorized its provisions and expanded its reach. And the Court was steadfast in
Congress’s support, both by recognizing exceptionally broad congressional power to act
and concurrently adopting a more capacious conception of the right to vote.
Among the VRA’s most notable features was the manner in which it targeted jurisdictions
in which disenfranchisement was most widespread. Section 4(b) designated jurisdictions
“covered” if they used a “test or device” to limit registration or voting, and less than half
the jurisdiction’s eligible citizens were either registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or
actually cast ballots in the presidential election that year.63 Section 4(a) prohibited
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jurisdictions covered under 4(b) from denying the right to vote to any person who
failed to comply with a test or device.64 Section 5 required that covered jurisdictions
obtain federal approval, known as “preclearance,” before changing any aspect of their
voting rules, and specifically, demonstrating that the changes they proposed were not
discriminatory in purpose or effect.65
(p. 373)

South Carolina was one of the seven states initially covered by the 4(b) formula.66 It
quickly brought suit seeking to scrap the statute as an “unjustified” and “arbitrary”
affront to the “Equality of Statehood” principle, and a “usurp[ation]” of the State’s
legislative and executive functions.67 The Warren Court disagreed. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach recognized extensive congressional power to craft “inventive” remedies to
address systematic racial discrimination in voting.68 The 4(b) coverage formula was
“rational in both practice and theory,” capturing the places where “Congress was …
entitled to infer a significant danger of … evil.”69 Section 4(a)’s suspension of the use of
tests and devices was a “legitimate response” to their discriminatory use.70 Section 5’s
preclearance requirement was justified because Congress “had reason to suppose” that
preclearance was needed to block evasive, discriminatory moves. Based on the record
before it, Congress could lawfully choose to “shift the advantage of time and inertia from
the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”71 Justice Black dissented alone, arguing that
preclearance impermissibly rendered covered states “little more than conquered
provinces.”72
South Carolina v. Katzenbach addressed Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment, but the Court soon made clear that Congress enjoyed similarly expansive
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.73 Katzenbach v. Morgan recognized this power
when it turned back a constitutional challenge to section 4(e) of the VRA, which barred
states from using English literacy as a prerequisite to voting for graduates of designated
non–English-language schools.74 Unlike the provisions upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, section 4(e) was a late addition to the statute and lacked a supporting
evidentiary record documenting the problem it purported to address. The provision,
moreover, did not target a practice in the Jim Crow South but instead the way in which
New York’s English literacy requirement functioned to disenfranchise large segments of
New York City’s Puerto Rican community.75
Despite these differences, Katzenbach v. Morgan76 readily upheld Congress’s power to
enact section 4(e). Requiring neither concrete evidence nor specific congressional
findings of any sort, the Court deemed it sufficient that Congress “might well have
questioned” the facially neutral justifications the state proffered for its literacy
requirements,77 and that (p. 374) the Court could “perceive a basis upon which the
Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.”78 The Court observed that Congress might
have concluded both that New York’s requirement itself constituted “invidious
discrimination in establishing voter qualifications,”79 and that it fostered “discrimination
in governmental services.”80 Morgan stated: “It is not for us to review the congressional
resolution” of the factors that informed that judgment.81 The decision thus endorsed vast
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congressional power to enforce the amendment, and, arguably, to interpret the scope of
the rights it protected as well.82
Bolstered by these judgments and broad statutory constructions the Court gave to the
regime,83 the VRA proved to be remarkably effective. Indeed, its impact was immediate
and sweeping. By the end of 1965, many thousands of black voters had registered, and by
1970, African-American turnout has risen dramatically.84 Before long, federal judges were
noting that black voters were registering and voting “without hindrance” in covered
jurisdictions.85
The VRA was slated to expire after five years, but Congress voted to extend the regime.
Reauthorizations in 1970 and again in 1975 updated the section 4(b) coverage formula to
include voter participation data from elections in 1968 and 1972 respectively.86 Congress
also voted to suspend literacy tests nationwide, and not just in covered jurisdictions, first
for five years,87 and then permanently.88 It also added significant new protections for
language minorities.
The Court upheld Congress’s power to extend the statute in these ways.89 In Oregon v.
Mitchell, Justice Hugo Black thought the nationwide ban on literacy tests was
constitutional because Congress “could have concluded” that discrimination in education
leaves some voters less equipped than others to pass the tests.90 Justice William J.
Brennan Jr. likewise saw a basis “upon which Congress could have” found literacy tests
have discriminatory effects due to past discrimination in education.91 Justice Potter
Stewart preferred a national ban to a geographically selective one, deemed it
“reasonable” and “appropriate” legislation, and saw no need for evidence showing that
the tests “unfairly burden[]” minority voters or “state-by-state findings” of any sort. After
all, “Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this Court.”92
In 1980, the Court again upheld the constitutionality of the VRA as reauthorized, albeit
now in a sharply divided decision. City of Rome v. United States93 arose when city officials
challenged a denial of preclearance made pursuant to the 1975 reauthorization, arguing,
inter alia, that Congress lacked power to ban implementation of electoral practices that
were discriminatory only in effect.94 Mobile v. Bolden,95 decided the same day as (p. 375)
City of Rome, made clear that public conduct does not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments simply because it has a racially disproportionate impact.96 City of Rome
held that Congress could nevertheless proscribe implementation of electoral changes in
covered jurisdictions that were discriminatory solely in effect. Citing South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,97 the Court noted that such state action, although constitutional, may
“perpetuate[] the effects of past discrimination,” and “create the risk of purposeful
discrimination”98 in covered jurisdictions. Three justices disagreed, claiming the VRA was
unconstitutional under this approach.99
Congress responded to both City of Rome and Mobile v. Bolden in 1982. A contentious
debate pitted support for restoring the regime to its pre-Mobile contours against those
concerned that a purely effect-based proscription would necessarily devolve into
proportional representation. The amendments that resulted extended the preclearance
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regime for twenty-five years and, in response to objections voiced by the dissenters in
City of Rome, expanded opportunities for covered jurisdictions to “bail out” from the
preclearance requirements. Most notably, the 1982 amendments significantly altered
section 2 of the VRA. Once thought to be coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment, the
provision was amended to proscribe any voting practice that “results in a denial or
abridgement” of the right to vote based on race or membership in designated language
minority communities.100 Rather than a pure disparate impact test, the new provision
mandated a complex inquiry derived from foundational cases defining racial vote dilution
in which many factors are relevant, and none dispositive.101
This multi-factored section 2 inquiry quickly led to disagreements among federal courts
adjudicating claims under the new provision. In 1986, Thornburg v. Gingles sought to
clarify the circumstances under which section 2 liability exists.102 Gingles did so by
distilling three “preconditions” to a section 2 claim, namely, that plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single member district,” and that both minority and white voters
vote cohesively and in opposition to one another.103 After Gingles, plaintiffs who made
these showings typically prevailed.104
Gingles identified circumstances likely to give rise to liability under section 2, while
leaving unresolved how violations of section 2 might be remedied.105 The framework
Gingles established nevertheless invited the creation of majority-minority districts both to
remedy and to avoid section 2 violations.106 Gingles also prompted covered jurisdictions
(p. 376) to include more majority-minority districts in proposed districting plans than they
had previously, to secure compliance with section 5.107 They did so because compliance
with section 5 was understood to require compliance with section 2 (at least until the
Court ruled otherwise in 1997);108 because the majority-minority districts addressed
specific concerns arising under section 5, and because the Department of Justice
repeatedly denied preclearance to redistricting plans the agency thought contained too
few majority-minority districts.109
As a result, districting plans began including a larger proportion of majority-minority
districts than they once had. Voters in these districts largely, albeit not exclusively,
elected minority candidates to office.110 By the mid-1990s, more minority representatives
were serving on school boards, city councils, state legislatures, and in the U.S. House of
Representatives than at any time since Reconstruction.111

IV. Stasis and Skepticism, 1986-2005
Congress took no action in response to Gingles and the framework it imposed on section 2
and the VRA. Content to leave interpretation and implementation of the 1982 VRA
amendments to others, Congress made no changes to the regime for the duration of the
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Rehnquist Court. It enacted a host of new civil rights and non–race-related voting laws
during this period,112 but it would not address the VRA again until it set out to
reauthorize its expiring provisions beginning in 2005.
The Rehnquist Court, by contrast, addressed the VRA repeatedly and skeptically. To be
sure, skepticism about the VRA predated William Rehnquist’s 1986 confirmation as chief
justice,113 but under his leadership, and as new justices appointed by Presidents Reagan
and George H.W. Bush joined the Court, a reluctant stance toward the constitutional
underpinnings and effects of federal intervention mandated by the VRA made its way into
majority opinions with increasing frequency. The Rehnquist Court was particularly uneasy
about the proliferation of majority-minority districts and the type of political participation
it thought they fostered.114 The Court accordingly pursued a steady and determined
project to rein in the regime and restrict use of the majority-minority district.
It did so in two related ways. First, the Court consistently read the VRA narrowly, thereby
limiting the instances in which liability might arise and a new majority-minority (p. 377)
district might be required.115 The Court also recognized a new “analytically distinct”
injury under the equal protection clause that arose when jurisdictions created oddly
shaped majority-minority districts that were not absolutely required by the VRA.116 This
new constitutional injury blunted the incentive to draw majority-minority districts
prophylactically to avoid liability under the VRA. Taken together, these steps scaled back
the VRA’s reach and reduced opportunities to employ its dominant remedy.
And yet, even as the Rehnquist Court cabined the VRA, the Court concurrently affirmed,
with surprising vigor, Congress’s power to craft remedies for racial discrimination in
voting. Notably, the Court did so at the same time it was placing significant curbs on
Congress’s power to craft civil rights remedies that did not implicate race and the right to
vote.117
The Rehnquist Court’s principal turn against federally legislated civil rights remedies
began in 1997 when City of Boerne v. Flores struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act because the act lacked “congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”118 The Court
held that RFRA was not “appropriate legislation” within the meaning of section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the constitutional injuries it purported to address were
too few in number, and it lacked sufficient connection to the rules the statute imposed on
state and local governments.119 As the Court saw it, RFRA was not an attempt to enforce
rights the Court had identified as constitutionally protected but instead an attempt by
Congress to declare the content of constitutional rights themselves. City of Boerne held
that, with this attempt, Congress overstepped its enforcement authority.
By 2001, five more federal statutes had fallen under the new “congruence and
proportionality” standard.120 Applying rigorous review, the Court deemed linkages
between statutory proscriptions and constitutional injuries too attenuated, statutory
remedies too broad, and underlying congressional findings too skimpy to render various
statutory provisions valid exercises of Congress’s enforcement power. Boerne and its
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progeny made clear that Congress could rely on neither general assertions nor isolated
examples of unconstitutional conduct, but instead valid enforcement legislation needed to
rest on a record documenting a widespread pattern of such conduct by the entities
subject to suit.121
This rigorous review differed markedly from the approach the Court took when it had
previously upheld Congress’s exercise of its enforcement powers in crafting the VRA. The
(p. 378) early cases upholding the VRA all deferred to Congress’s judgments regarding
the need for particular remedies, including ones that intruded deeply into state sovereign
processes, and prohibited conduct the Constitution permits.122 And yet, the Boerne cases
did not purport to overrule the VRA precedent. To the contrast, the new decisions
explicitly left the older ones largely intact.123 Boerne cited the provisions upheld in the
VRA cases from South Carolina v. Katzenbach through City of Rome as examples of
permissible enforcement legislation, despite both “the burdens those measures placed on
the States” and their proscription of constitutional conduct.124 Boerne’s progeny likewise
invoked the earlier VRA provisions as examples of permissible congressional action, and
cited the decisions upholding them as so establishing.125
The Boerne decisions, however, did not adequately distinguish the statutory provisions
the earlier VRA decisions upheld from those the Court had now struck down. Boerne itself
insisted that valid enforcement legislation did not require the elements that most
obviously distinguished the VRA from the RFRA.126 Nor did the Court ever explain why it
accorded so much deference to Congress in the early VRA cases and so little in the
Boerne decisions.127 And while the Court may have simply been reluctant to overturn
older, historically resonant decisions,128 just three years after Boerne, the Court again
upheld the constitutionality of the VRA’s preclearance obligation. Lopez v. Monterey
County129 easily affirmed Congress’s power “to guard against changes that give rise to a
discriminatory effect” in covered jurisdictions,130 and emphasized that the Fifteenth
Amendment permits “this intrusion” into state sovereignty.131 Justice Thomas dissented
alone, arguing that the majority’s construction of the VRA contravened the City of Boerne
standard.132
Read together, Lopez and the Boerne cases show that the Rehnquist Court accepted broad
congressional power to enact and reauthorize the VRA even as it curbed congressional
power to enforce civil rights more generally. And although the Court never explicitly
offered an explanation for this stance, Boerne itself provides a suggestion. The decision
not only preserved the VRA precedent, but endorsed a critical rationale underlying it.
One of the reasons Katzenbach v. Morgan had upheld section 4(e) of the VRA—which,
recall, had banned particular English literacy tests—was that it promised to provide New
York’s Puerto Rican community with “enhanced political power [that] will be helpful in
gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services… .”133 Boerne expressly affirmed
the (p. 379) validity of this rationale, stating that the exercise of congressional power
“rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New York… .”134
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Notably, this “unconstitutional discrimination” had not been documented in the record
supporting 4(e)’s enactment. It was, in fact, purely prospective. And yet, even as Boerne
rejected Morgan’s suggestion that Congress might define constitutional rights, it still
endorsed Morgan’s understanding of section 4(e) as a vehicle “to give Puerto Ricans
‘enhanced political power’ that would be ‘helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment
in public services … .’ ”135 In other words, Boerne agreed with Morgan that
disenfranchisement increases the likelihood that those disenfranchised will confront
discrimination in other realms. Boerne agreed that section 4(e) was an effort to diminish
the prospect of such discrimination and thereby foster more responsive state governance.
For this reason, deferring to Congress on the VRA comported with the Rehnquist Court’s
distinct views on federalism. It allowed intrusive federal intervention as a means to foster
democratic accountability and hence provide the foundation for state primacy in a host of
other areas.136

Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment

V. Reauthorization and the Roberts Court
Forty years after first enacting the VRA, Congress again voted to reauthorize the statute’s
expiring provisions. Following hearings held in 2005 and early 2006, Congress chose to
maintain the statute’s geographic reach, without adding or removing jurisdictions from
coverage, and declined to ease bailout by eligible jurisdictions, despite several proposals
that urged such action for reasons of policy and constitutional compliance.137 The few
substantive changes Congress made restored the VRA to operate as it had before the
Court adopted narrowing constructions in decisions from the early 2000s.138 The House
passed 2006 reauthorization by a large margin; the vote in the Senate was unanimous.
As was widely expected, a Boerne-based challenge to the 2006 reauthorization came
within days of its enactment. Opportunities for minority political participation had
indisputably improved since Congress first crafted the statute, and so the question was
whether the obstacles that persisted rose to the level Boerne and its progeny
demanded.139 Complicating matters was the fact that, unlike the statutes invalidated in
the Boerne cases, the VRA was not a new statute but one that had been operating for
many years. This meant that conditions in the places where the VRA’s reauthorized
regional provisions applied (p. 380) needed to be evaluated in light of the regime’s
ongoing operational effect. More specifically, that evaluation needed to determine
whether observable improvements signaled a problem solved or, instead, a problem kept
in check by the very regulatory measures in place.140
By all measures, the Roberts Court seemed inclined to deem the problem solved. In 2006,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito had replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor, respectively, and the new justices seemed less inclined to support the VRA than
their predecessors, who, admittedly, had already viewed the statute with considerable
skepticism and only qualified support.141 At oral argument, for example, Chief Justice
Roberts would colorfully equate the preclearance regime to an “elephant whistle,”
shooing away a nonexistent threat.142 But before that and even before the 2006
reauthorization became law, the new chief justice had reacted to a redistricting plan
imposed as the consequence of the VRA with the observation, “it is a sordid business, this
divvying us by race.”143
Unlike the Rehnquist Court, however, the Roberts Court’s discomfort with the VRA stems
not simply from a considered distaste for majority-minority districts and the type of
political participation they engender, but also from a less contextual objection to raceconscious decision-making of any sort. While the Rehnquist Court tolerated a good deal of
such decision-making,144 the Roberts Court is more inclined to limit or dislodge mandates
to consider race whenever it confronts them, regardless of whether the source is federal,
state, or local law. As Chief Justice Roberts famously said, “The way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”145
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This sentiment led the Roberts Court to reject a broad construction of section 2 of the
VRA that would have increased the junctures in which districting officials needed to
consider race to comply with the regime. Bartlett v. Strickland146 cabined the statute
rather than expand opportunities for race-conscious decision-making. The decision
limited the statute in this way even though it would cut off an application of the VRA that
promised to foster cross-racial coalitions outside of majority-minority districts, and hence
encourage a type of political participation the Rehnquist Court had once celebrated.147
The Roberts Court, moreover, has coupled its commitment to color-blindness with
a preference for applying the Boerne doctrine rigorously. Late Rehnquist Court decisions
had tempered Boerne and upheld statutes that would have fallen under the doctrine as
originally employed,148 but the Roberts Court has made clear it favors the more
demanding approach.149 This inclination, in turn, rendered the constitutional challenge to
the 2006 VRA reauthorization even more serious.
(p. 381)

Still, on its first pass at the issue, the Court chose to sidestep the constitutional question.
Writing for the Court in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder (NAMUDNO),150 Chief Justice Roberts expressed considerable skepticism about
the continued need for the regime,151 and made clear that the Court stood ready to scrap
the statute in the next case absent changed circumstances.152
Four years later, Shelby County v. Holder rendered the VRA’s preclearance regime
inoperative by scrapping the section 4(b) coverage formula.153 Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion concluded that the evidence of ongoing discrimination—as catalogued by
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent 154—was legally insufficient to justify the statute’s
continued regional application.155 As explanation, the chief justice noted that this
discrimination was not as severe as it was when Congress first crafted the regime in
1965, that the changes in voter access and participation had not led Congress to alter the
statute’s preexisting coverage formula, and that contemporary discrimination
encompassed conduct that differed from the conduct Congress listed in the coverage
formula when it first subjected places to the regime’s requirements.156
These observations were all true, but they also should have been irrelevant—at least
under applicable doctrine the Shelby County majority did not purport to displace.157 The
fact that the misconduct documented in the 2006 record was not equivalent to the brazen
defiance of constitutional norms that originally prompted Congress to enact the statute
does not explain why the contemporary, unconstitutional discrimination Justice Ginsburg
described could not be remedied in the manner Congress selected. The Warren Court
recognized that Congress possessed nearly plenary authority when crafting such
remedies.158 And even while the Rehnquist Court pulled back, it never suggested that
prevalent constitutional violations should go unremedied simply because past conditions
were worse than contemporary ones.159 Shelby County, by contrast, seemed to limit
Congress’s power to craft remedies for unconstitutional racial discrimination simply
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because the discrimination fell short of the radical type that defined Alabama in 1965.
But the Court did not explain why.
Nor did the Court make clear why Congress’s decision to maintain the statute’s
preexisting coverage formula was constitutional error. To be sure, on a clean slate, a
decision to regulate unregulated entities based on voter participation decades ago would
be difficult to defend. One might well agree with the Court that had Congress “started
from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present coverage formula.”160
And yet, the Court was plainly wrong when it insisted “that is exactly what Congress has
done.”161 Congress was decidedly not starting from scratch in 2006. Instead, it was
confronted with the question whether a lawfully imposed remedial regime should
continue.
(p. 382)

Prior to Shelby County, there was extensive debate as to whether the record Congress
assembled was adequate to support its decision to reauthorize the regime. The Shelby
County majority, however, did not engage in that debate. It simply rejected the notion that
Congress could have rationally concluded that current conditions justified preserving the
existing coverage formula. But, standing alone, the fact that Congress chose to
reauthorize the existing formula proves nothing. Insofar as the Court thought there was a
mismatch between coverage and unconstitutional conduct, the Court needed to consider
the record on its merits and explain both where it thought it was deficient and why the
deference usually accorded Congress when finding facts did not apply.162 It did neither.
Finally, the fact that much of the 2006 record addressed so-called “second-generation”
barriers such as racial vote dilution should have been of no consequence. Such barriers
predated the VRA by decades and stood among the varied tactics used concurrently in
the Jim Crow South to limit political participation by African-American citizens.163
Although Congress did not explicitly include these barriers in the section 4(b) coverage
formula, the criteria it selected—namely, the use of tests and devices and low voter
participation—were meant to capture the places that employed these very barriers. That
is, the triggering criteria were not meant to limit the statute’s reach but instead to
capture places in which a broader range of conduct (including “second generation”
conduct) had rendered the Fifteenth Amendment a nullity. In early decisions, the Court
had explicitly recognized the statute to reach this conduct,164 and Congress repeatedly
extended the statute with this understanding. And yet, the Shelby County majority
insisted otherwise. In short, the reasons given by the Shelby County majority for section
4(b)’s invalidity do not explain why the provision had become invalid.
These articulated reasons, of course, do not prevent responsive action by Congress. And
yet, the oddity of the Court’s analysis complicates the task of crafting a constitutionally
viable response, even if Congress proves willing to act.165 Shelby County managed to
respond to a Boerne-based challenge without mentioning Boerne or the standard of
review at all. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion argued that the majority’s analysis
rendered preclearance not just moot, but unconstitutional as well.166 While the majority
opinion fell (p. 383) short of so holding, it was willing to immobilize a remedy Congress
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crafted in the face of evidence of extensive ongoing discrimination that Justice Ginsburg
described in detail and the majority did not question. That the majority did so despite the
deference previously accorded to Congress in this context suggests serious limits now
attach to Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.

Conclusion
Without doubt, preclearance had always been an unusual remedy, one that presumed
public action was discriminatory rather than legitimate. It is certainly arguable that the
Court’s willingness to halt preclearance rested on the regime’s distinctive features of
coverage.167 If so, Congress would retain significant discretion to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment, and section 2 of the VRA could remain a fully viable, if notably imperfect,
substitute for section 5.168 Put differently, the reservations voiced by the Roberts Court
about congressional power and color-consciousness do not inexorably apply beyond the
preclearance regime to future cases challenging electoral practices for their racially
disproportionate impacts.
Indeed, Shelby County could be followed by a decision that embraces distinct
congressional power to protect voting free from racial discrimination and other
hindrances. Nearly a century and half ago, United States v. Reese169 struck down a key
provision of a federal statute enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment despite undisputed
evidence of unconstitutional racial discrimination in voting. Reese left room for Congress
to remedy identified defects, and Ex parte Yarbrough followed, in which the Court
recognized Congress’s distinct and broad power to protect those rights essential to the
healthy operation of government. The Roberts Court could do the same.
And yet, there is good reason to doubt that it will. Shelby County’s toleration for
unremedied or inadequately remedied discrimination, including, notably, discrimination
that violates the Constitution, was not an isolated occurrence. Rather, it represents an
increasingly common stance in the Roberts Court, evident in a range of cases that
together suggest the Court thinks the contemporary civil rights regime does more harm
than the discrimination it presently addresses, even when that discrimination is
indisputably unconstitutional or otherwise invidious in nature. Under this view, existing
civil rights laws do not simply make victims of undeniable discrimination whole, but
instead place a host of interested parties, victims included, in a decidedly better position
than they would have been had the discrimination never occurred. For this reason, the
Roberts Court tends to view the regime as a costly and damaging enterprise that should
be limited at every opportunity.170 The Roberts Court, accordingly, seems unlikely to
identify the intersection of racial (p. 384) discrimination and the right to vote as a
juncture in which Congress’s judgments regarding remedies warrant particular respect.
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To be sure, recognition of congressional power does little absent congressional action.
Yarbrough, for instance, brought no relief to African-American voters in the South, given
that Congress failed for decades to exercise the broad power the decision identified. And
yet, existing provisions of the VRA left untouched by Shelby County might be used to
displace a wide array of discriminatory obstacles to political participation, even as they
fall short of providing a full substitute for the preclearance regime. Their ability to do so,
however, hinges on the Court’s willingness to temper the rigorous stance it employed in
Shelby County, and afford the regime Congress crafted more deference in future cases.
Congress presently looks like it possesses less power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment
than it ever has had before. But the Roberts Court still has work to do, and its stance on
Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment may yet evolve. Congress and the
Court have worked cooperatively before, and they are sure to do so again. When a more
cooperative stance will remerge and the goals it will advance remains to be seen.
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